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CIA loses foreign cont

in wake of probes, ex

William Beecher, The Globe's diplomatic correspondent, interviewed more than a score of present and former intelligence officials to examine the implications of recent exposes. In a three-part series he discusses the impact on foreign intelligence-gathering, adjustments made to ride out the storm and future prospects for US intelligence capability.

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WASHINGTON — Within recent months, British and West German intelligence services, which long had freely exchanged the most sensitive information with their American counterparts, have become chary of providing such data.

During the same period, a number of major US corporations, which have provided cover abroad for Central Intelligence Agency operatives or insights on little-known economic and political trends overseas, also have become reluctant to cooperate as before.

And large numbers of foreign agents and contacts, always worried that an indiscretion could jeopardize their jobs or their lives, have become increasingly nervous about passing on documents or even rumors.

Well-placed sources in or otherwise familiar with the American intelligence community report that such developments are a direct result of congressional hearings and newspaper exposes of certain questionable activities on the part of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Comments one top CIA official: "It would be overstating the situation to say our sources abroad have dried up. But there's no doubt we're hurting. People who used to give us whole reports now are giving us only summaries. People who used to give us summaries are only giving us one or two facts. Others who used to pass along an occasional nugget at a diplomatic party, are now not willing to shake hands or even smile."

The reasons for this sudden skittishness: fear that information turned over to CIA could conceivably be provided to Capitol Hill and thence either released wholesale or leaked — with damaging, in some cases deadly, consequences.

Indeed, a Congressional source says certain committees have been advised that following a recent Congressional revelation a Middle East country put two and two together and executed one of its officials believed to have been supplying information to CIA. The source declined to be more specific.

But while conceding at least temporary damage to foreign intelligence gathering, several intelligence experts interviewed by The Globe over recent weeks stressed that exposure of excesses and illegalities by American intelligence was direly needed in order to force reforms of the system.

Clark Clifford is one such person. Having helped draft the 1947 legislation which created the CIA and having served for seven years, first as a member and later as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, he is particularly well qualified to assess the situation. He says:

"In the main, our intelligence operation served this country through very t times, for nearly 3(Now the time has come to profit from lessons learned and to overhaul this sometimes free-wheeling machine.

"Some of those engaged in intelligence deplore the investigation that's been going on. They take the position that there's something unpatriotic and naive and unsophisticated about the whole thing. I disagree. If we find that under our democratic system we have created an operation which has grossly offended important tenets we adhere to, then it ought to be changed. The most important job government has is to correct these abuses."

Both critics and defenders of the CIA and its sister agencies agree, however, that never before has the nation had greater need for clear, insightful intelligence on military, political and economic developments in the Soviet Union and throughout much of the world.

If detente with Russia is to continue, for example, it is vital that both sides have confidence they know to what extent agreements between them are being honored. And if detente should collapse, with a reversion to cold war attitudes, detailed knowledge of Soviet capabilities and probable intentions would obviously

activity.

On covert programs in places such as Chile and Laos, many observers feel it is unfair to pillory the CIA for operations authorized and minutely directed from the White House.

On domestic operation, which are precluded by CIA's charter, such as penetrating and spying on antiwar movements, even insiders concede the agency should have strenuously resisted such assignments.

On small scale covert and clandestine operations, informed sources claim there has been a propensity in some cases for exceeding authorized actions. Very little has surfaced publicly on this. There was, however, the case of a middle level CIA official who took it upon himself to disobey an order to destroy some deadly toxins developed for use in possible assassinations.

But of more than a score of specialists interviewed, none felt the "rogue elephant" concept of the CIA running amok and out of control was fair or justified.

Ray S. Cline, who spent about 20 years in top analytical and operational assignments with CIA and four years as director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, believes that while the intelligence structure requires re-

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